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Chapter 585: A Renewed Effort to Restore Integrity to
California’s Vocational and Postsecondary Educational
Institutions
Michael Coleman
Code Sections Affected
Education Code § 94913 (new), §§ 94897, 94909, 94910, 94911,
94928, 94929.5, 94929.7 (amended).
AB 2296 (Block); 2012 STAT. Ch. 585.
I. INTRODUCTION
California has been struggling for decades to create a suitable regulatory
scheme to govern the State’s private vocational and postsecondary educational
1
2
institutions. The outcry for legislative reform began in the late 1980s, as
3
newspapers began reporting on the proliferation of so-called “diploma mills.”
Since then, the legislature has enacted a number of reforms, all of which have
been criticized for failing to adequately protect students and the public from
4
disingenuous private institutions.

1. Private Postsecondary Overview, BUREAU FOR PRIVATE POSTSECONDARY EDUC., http://www.bppe.
ca.gov/about_us/history.shtml (last visited Oct. 13, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (detailing
the legislature’s efforts to regulate private postsecondary education since the late 1980s, and the resulting
criticism of those efforts); see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94897(p) (amended by Chapter 585) (defining private
postsecondary institutions as institutions that offer “associate, baccalaureate, master’s, or doctoral degree[s]”).
2. Editorial, Bogus Education, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 9, 1989, available at 1989 WLNR 1605588 (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (calling for legislative reform that will prevent “diploma mills” from
threatening the integrity of legitimate postsecondary degrees).
3. Herbert A. Sample, Private College Regulation Gets Failing Grade, Mar. 1, 1989, available at 1989
WLNR 2936140 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that a report to the legislature concludes
that reputation of California’s legitimate educational institutions suffers due to the large number of illegitimate
institutions, and that regulation is necessary to protect the integrity of legitimate degrees); William Trombley,
Foes Call Legislation ‘Elitist’: Stricter Scrutiny Sought for Unaccredited Schools, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1989,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/1989-09-06/news/mn-1620_1_postsecondary-schools (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that, throughout California, institutions purporting to be schools and
universities offer students advanced degrees with little-to-no instruction, after payment of a fee).
4. Private Postsecondary Overview, supra note 1 (detailing the legislature’s efforts from 1989 to 2007 to
enact lasting reform, and highlighting periodic government reports concluding that the original problems
“continue to persist”); Jennifer Gollan, More Than 130 Vocational Schools Are Operating Without State
Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2012, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/06/us/californiavocational-schools-operating-without-approval.html?pagewanted=all (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(reporting that the regulatory bureau responsible for enforcing postsecondary education reforms has failed to
crack down on institutions that operate illegally, thus endangering students who believe their schools to be
credible, and the public who relies on the integrity of conferred degrees).
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Recently, the discussion concerning postsecondary education reform has
5
focused on schools’ reporting requirements. The thrust of this discussion is that
prospective students need to be adequately informed, prior to enrollment, of the
limitations of the degree they seek and the viable employment opportunities and
6
salaries that await them after graduation. By passing Chapter 585, the legislature
seeks to protect prospective students by closing reporting loopholes created by
7
prior laws. However, due in part to the limited enforcement capabilities of the
State’s regulatory body, it is unclear whether Chapter 585 will effectively protect
8
students and the public from disingenuous private institutions.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In the late 1980s, California was known as the “diploma mill capital of the
9
world.” To combat this problem, the legislature passed the Private
10
Postsecondary and Vocational Education Reform Act of 1989 (the 1989 Act).
This comprehensive legislation was meant to address “concerns about the
integrity and value of the degrees and diplomas issued, widely varying standards,
the lack of enforcement provisions, and the exemptions from oversight
11
authorized in statute.” During the 1990s and early 2000s, the legislature enacted
a series of legislative reforms to cure perceived deficiencies in the 1989 Act,
including charges that it was difficult to interpret and that the regulatory bureau
12
in charge of enforcement was merely “a passive regulator.”

5. See generally SENATE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2296 (June 19,
2012) (stating that the purpose of both the Postsecondary Education Reform Act of 2009 and Chapter 585 is to
expand on the reporting requirements “to be met by private postsecondary educational institutions subject to
state oversight”).
6. Heather W. Hines, California Attorney General Warns Sailors Against Scams, U.S. NAVY (Apr. 2,
2011), http://www.navy.mil/search/print.asp?story_id=59528&VIRIN=84438&imagetype=1&page=1 (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that many private postsecondary institutions are for-profit
businesses that mislead prospective students by making “unrealistic guarantees . . . including employment
following graduation”); SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2296, at 4 (Aug. 22, 2012)
(reporting that Assembly Member Marty Block authored Chapter 585 in part to address concerns that, under
prior law, institutions were not required to provide prospective students with accurate statistics reflecting
graduates’ salaries).
7. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2296, at 3–4 (May 11, 2012).
8. Gollan, supra note 4.
9. BENJAMIN M. FRANK, CAL. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, INITIAL REPORT, ES-3 (2005).
10. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94700 (West 2002); id. § 94705(a)–(f) (stating that the legislative intent of the
1989 Act was to establish minimum standards for institutional and instructional quality, as well as to prohibit
“the granting of false or misleading educational credentials” to protect “the consumer and students against
fraud, misrepresentation, or other practices that may lead to an improper loss of funds paid for educational
costs”); FRANK, supra note 9, at ES-3., 9 n.1 (noting that the 1989 Act was introduced by Senator Morgan as SB
190); Trombley, supra note 3 (reporting that Senator Becky Morgan introduced the legislation to protect
California’s legitimate educational institutions from suffering diminished reputations due to “diploma mills”).
11. FRANK, supra note 9, at ES-3.
12. Private Postsecondary Overview, supra note 1.
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On June 30, 2007, the 1989 Act sunsetted, resulting in the dissolution of the
13
Bureau for Private Postsecondary and Vocational Education. The dissolution
caused concern for many who feared that diploma mills would once again begin
operating with impunity, resulting in scores of students receiving expensive, but
14
worthless degrees. In vetoing legislation that would have extended the 1989
Act’s provisions, Governor Schwarzenegger stated that extending the life of the
1989 Act would simply “allow[] problems that have been well documented to
15
continue to exist,” because it did “nothing to enhance protections for students.”
From 2007 to 2009, the legislature attempted, without success, to enact new,
16
comprehensive legislation to restore regulatory oversight over these institutions.
Finally, in 2009, the legislature passed the California Private Postsecondary
Education Reform Act of 2009 (the 2009 Act), which reestablished the old
regulatory body under a new name—the Bureau for Private Postsecondary
17
Education (the Bureau).
The 2009 Act also codified a number of reform measures, including a
statutory definition of how to determine whether graduates are employed in their
18
field of study, minimum reporting requirements for unaccredited private

13. 1997 Cal. Stat. ch. 78, § 4, at 579 (enacting EDUC. § 94999) (extending the life of the 1989 Act until
January 1, 2005, unless otherwise extended by further legislation); 2004 Cal. Stat. ch. 740, § 7, at 5785–86
(amending EDUC. § 94999) (extending the 1997 extension to June 30, 2007); Judy Lin, Oregon Warns Governor
on Loss of Schools Watchdog, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 3, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 12576451 (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that the legislature did not extend the life of the 1989 Act by the
June 30, 2007 deadline); Students Urged to Research Carefully When Choosing Private Postsecondary or
Vocational School, U.S. ST. NEWS, July 5, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 12879968 (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that the California Legislature allowed the 1989 Act to sunset).
14. Students Urged to Research Carefully when Choosing Private Postsecondary or Vocational School,
supra note 13 (reporting the California Department of Consumer Affairs’ position that, with the dissolution of
Bureau, students need to research especially carefully before spending thousands of dollars on educational
programs); Editorial, Failing Vocational Students: California Students Will Have Few Protections from Bogus
Schools, FRESNO BEE, July 6, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 12840190 (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (expressing opinion that closure of the Bureau “marks a return to the days when California was known
for being the nation’s worst center for ‘diploma mills,’ turning a blind eye to schools that provide neither an
education nor a usable credential”).
15. Private Postsecondary Overview, supra note 1 (quoting the Governor’s veto message).
16. Id. (stating that in 2008, Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed Senate Bill 823); SB 823, 2008 Leg.,
2007–2008 Sess. (Cal. 2008) (as amended on Aug. 13, 2008, but not enacted) (proposing the creation of a
subsequent bureau to oversee secondary education and other comprehensive reform measures to ensure
legislative oversight); see also EDUC. § 94801 (West Supp. 2012) (declaring that the California Private
Postsecondary Education Act of 2009 was the first piece of comprehensive legislation to govern private
postsecondary education since expiration of the 1989 Act).
17. EDUC. §§ 94800, 94800.5. The Bureau falls under the purview of the California Department of
Consumer Affairs. Glossary of Terms, Higher Education Systems or Segments, CAL. POSTSECONDARY EDUC.
COMM’N, http://www.cpec.ca.gov/SecondPages/Glossary.asp?ListType=5 (last visited Mar. 30, 2013) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review). Private postsecondary institutions that fall within the ambit of the 2009 Act
must get approval from the Bureau to operate legally within California. Gollan, supra note 4.
18. EDUC. § 94928(e) (defining “graduates employed in the field” as those employed “within six months
of graduation” in a job where the skills acquired through obtaining the degree played a significant participating
role “in obtaining the position”).
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institutions, and requirements that both accredited and unaccredited private
20
institutions provide prospective students with graduates’ salary data and job
21
placement statistics. Additionally, the 2009 Act required institutions to include
specific language in their student enrollment agreements informing students that
they must be given, prior to enrollment, a student brochure and a School
22
Performance Fact Sheet (Fact Sheet). The purpose of this statement was to
23
inform students of the types of data contained within these documents. Finally,
the 2009 Act mandated specific methods for determining the required statistical
24
data.
Despite reestablishment of the Bureau and the 2009 Act’s new statutory
reforms, oversight over California’s vocational and postsecondary institutions
25
remained lackluster. The reestablished Bureau was understaffed and made it a
practice to pursue violators only after receiving specific complaints from the
26
public. As a result, the Bureau allowed more than 130 schools to continue
27
operating illegally. Additionally, the 2009 Act’s statutory reforms were also
limited in scope, providing loopholes and reporting exemptions for swaths of
28
private institutions.
III. CHAPTER 585
Chapter 585 amends the 2009 Act by attempting to close reporting
29
loopholes. This attempt may be broken into four broad categories: (A) new
30
disclosure requirements for unaccredited institutions; (B) new disclosure
31
requirements for all regulated institutions; (C) new criteria for calculating

19. Id. § 94897(p).
20. Id. § 94910(d)(1)–(2).
21. Id. § 94910(b).
22. Id. § 94911(i)(1).
23. Id. (requiring institutions’ enrollment agreements to inform students that the Fact Sheets must
include “completion rates, placement rates, license examination passage rates, salaries or wages”).
24. Id. § 94929.5(a), (c).
25. Gollan, supra note 4 (reporting that the Bureau does not make it a practice to pursue violators unless
it receives complaints from the public regarding specific institutions).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. EDUC. § 94897(p) (stating that only unaccredited doctoral programs—as opposed to all unaccredited
postsecondary programs—must honestly report accreditation status to students); id. § 94910(b) (mandating that
only postsecondary institutions that make claims regarding students’ employment and salary potential must
accurately report these figures to prospective students; institutions that do not make any such claims are
exempt).
29. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2296, at 2–3, 6 (Aug. 22, 2012).
30. EDUC. § 94897(p)(1)–(3) (amended by Chapter 585).
31. Id. § 94909(a)(16)(A)–(C) (amended by Chapter 585); id. § 94910(b), (d) (amended by Chapter
585); id. § 94911(i)(1)–(2) (amended by Chapter 585); id. § 94913 (enacted by Chapter 585).
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32

employment statistics; and (D) expanded authority of the Bureau to define
33
standards and create regulations concerning private postsecondary institutions.
A. New Disclosure Requirements for Unaccredited Institutions
Prior law mandated that only unaccredited doctoral programs inform
34
prospective students of their accreditation status. These programs were also
required to disclose to prospective students “whether the degree issued is in a
field requiring licensure in California, and any known limitations of the
35
degree.”
Chapter 585 expands on this provision by requiring that doctoral programs,
as well as “associate, baccalaureate, [and] master’s” programs disclose their
36
accreditation status to prospective students. Institutions offering these programs
37
must also disclose the accreditation status of each specific regulated program.
Chapter 585 also expands the statutory definition of “any known limitations
38
of the degree.” At a minimum, schools must disclose whether a student is
39
eligible to sit for licensure in California and other states, disclose that
unaccredited degrees are “not recognized for some employment positions,”
40
including within California, and disclose that students attending unaccredited
41
institutions are ineligible for federal financial aid.
B. New Disclosure Requirements for All Regulated Institutions
Prior law required all regulated private institutions to “provide a prospective
student with a School Performance Fact Sheet containing” a mandatory list of
42
minimum disclosures. Chapter 585 expands this list by requiring the Fact Sheets
to include job placement rates for graduates of each of the institution’s
43
programs, if those programs are meant to lead to a “recognized career,
32. Id. § 94928(e)(1)–(3) (amended by Chapter 585).
33. Id. § 94928(e)(2)–(3) (amended by Chapter 585); id. § 94929.5(b) (amended by Chapter 585); id. §
94929.7(c) (amended by Chapter 585).
34. Id. § 94897(p) (West Supp. 2012).
35. Id.
36. Id. § 94897(p) (amended by Chapter 585); id. § 94909(a)(16) (amended by Chapter 585).
37. Id. § 94909(a)(16)(B)–(C) (amended by Chapter 585).
38. Id. § 94909(a)(16) (amended by Chapter 585).
39. Id. § 94897(p)(1) (amended by Chapter 585); id. § 94909(a)(16)(A) (amended by Chapter 585).
40. Id. § 94897(p)(2) (amended by Chapter 585). This provision requires that institutions provide
prospective students with a written provision that reads: “A degree program that is unaccredited or a degree
from an unaccredited institution is not recognized for some employment positions, including, but not limited to,
positions within the State of California.” Id. § 94909(a)(16)(B) (amended by Chapter 585).
41. Id. § 94897(p)(3) (amended by Chapter 585); id. § 94909(a)(16)(C) (amended by Chapter 585).
42. Id. § 94910 (West Supp. 2012).
43. Id. § 94910(b) (amended by Chapter 585). This provision amends prior law by changing the
requirement from “[p]lacement rates” of graduates to “placement rates [of graduates] for each educational
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occupation, vocation, job, or job title.” Fact Sheets must now also contain
45
statistics reflecting graduates’ salaries or wages. In addition, if the institution
participates in federal financial aid programs, Fact Sheets must include the
46
institution’s most recent three-year cohort default rate, as well as “the
47
percentage of enrolled students receiving federal [loans].”
Prior law required institutions to include a verbatim statement in their student
enrollment agreements informing students that schools must provide to the
48
student a student brochure and Fact Sheet prior to enrollment. Chapter 585 adds
to this statement by requiring institutions to provide students with the
institution’s three-year cohort default rate, where applicable, the school’s three49
year cohort default rate is a required disclosure within the Fact Sheet.
Immediately following this statement, enrolling students must certify by
50
signature that they have received these documents prior to enrollment.
Chapter 585 also amends prior law by adding a statutory provision requiring
all regulated institutions “maintain[ing] an Internet Web site” to include specific
51
information on that site. This includes the school’s catalogue, student brochures,
52
the Fact Sheet, and a link to the Bureau’s website.

program.” Compare id. § 94910(b) (West Supp. 2012), with id. § 94910(b) (amended by Chapter 585).
44. Id. § 94910(b) (amended by Chapter 585). This provision amends prior law by changing the
requirement from “particular career, occupation,” et cetera, to a “recognized career.” Compare id. § 94910(b)
(West Supp. 2012), with id. § 94910(b) (amended by Chapter 585).
45. Id. § 94910(d) (amended by Chapter 585). Chapter 585 amends this section by striking a provision
that institutions only disclose this data if the institution makes an “express or implied claim about the salary that
may be earned after” graduation. Compare id. § 94910(d) (West Supp. 2012), with id. § 94910(d) (amended by
Chapter 585).
46. Id. § 94910(h) (amended by Chapter 585). “A cohort default rate is the percentage of a school’s
borrowers who enter repayment on federal loans during a particular fiscal year and default . . . . These default
rates are ‘officially’ reported by the U.S. Department of Education once per year.” SENATE RULES COMMITTEE,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2296, at 3 (Aug. 22, 2012).
47. EDUC. § 94910(h) (amended by Chapter 585). As a practical matter, this provision only applies to
students attending accredited institutions, because current federal law only allows students attending accredited
private postsecondary and vocational institutions to receive federal student loans. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§
1091(a), 1094(a) (1994) (requiring enrollment in an eligible institution for students to receive federal aid); 34
C.F.R. §§ 600.4(a)(5)(i), 600.5(a)(6)–(7), 600.6(a)(5)(i) (2012) (collectively defining institutions of higher
education, proprietary institutions of higher education, and postsecondary vocational institutions). However,
were federal law to be amended to extend aid to students attending unaccredited institutions, this provision
would become applicable to those unaccredited institutions that choose to participate in federal aid programs.
EDUC. § 94910(h) (amended by Chapter 585).
48. EDUC. § 94911(i)(1) (West Supp. 2012).
49. Id. (amended by Chapter 585).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 94913 (enacted by Chapter 585).
52. Id.
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C. New Criteria for Calculating Employment Statistics
Prior law defined “graduates employed in the field” as those employed
“within six months of graduation” in a job where the skills acquired through
obtaining the degree played a significant participating role “in obtaining the
53
position.” Chapter 585 changes this definition by striking the significant
participating role provision, instead making the deciding factor whether the
graduate is employed “in a single position for which the institution represents the
54
program prepares its graduates.”
Chapter 585 also extends the six-month “period of employment” in situations
where the graduate is attempting to obtain a position for which the state requires
55
they must first pass an exam. Where this extension applies, “the period of
employment shall begin within six months of the announcement of the
56
examination results for the first examination available after” graduation.
D. Expanded Authority of the Bureau
Under both prior and current law, institutions must provide the Bureau with
an annual report containing the same statistical data published in an institution’s
57
Fact Sheet. Chapter 585 expands the Bureau’s authority by allowing it to define
the information institutions must use to compute these statistics, and by
empowering it to require institution to substantiate their reports by turning over
58
to the Bureau the raw data used. However, Chapter 585 limits the scope of this
authority to information that is “[u]seful to students,” “[u]seful to policymakers,”
“[b]ased upon the most credible and verifiable data available,” and which “[d]oes
59
not impose undue compliance burdens on an institution.”
IV. ANALYSIS
Chapter 585 amends prior law by expanding the number of institutions and
60
programs subject to certain reporting requirements, creating new criteria to
53. Id. § 94928(e) (West Supp. 2012).
54. Id. § 94928(e)(1) (amended by Chapter 585).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. § 94929.5(a), (c) (West Supp. 2012) (annual report must include “job placement
rate[s] . . . license examination passage rates” and “[s]alary and wage information”); id. § 94929.5(a)(4)
(amended by Chapter 585) (in addition to disclosures required under prior law, report must also include threeyear cohort default rate, if applicable).
58. Id. § 94929.5(b) (amended by Chapter 585); id. § 94929.7(c) (amended by Chapter 585).
59. Id. § 94929.5(b)(1)–(4) (amended by Chapter 585).
60. Id. § 94897(p) (amended by Chapter 585) (requiring unaccredited institutions that offer associate,
baccalaureate, master’s, or doctoral degrees to report their accreditations status and all known limitations of the
degree to prospective students). Prior to passage of Chapter 585, only unaccredited institutions that offer a
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61

calculate graduates’ employment statistics, and expanding the Bureau’s
62
authority to make new regulations. But while this legislation may accomplish
some of its goals, Chapter 585 raises several questions, including whether
63
targeted institutions will actually comply with the new regulations, whether the
64
new requirements actually improve the accuracy of institutional reporting, and
whether the Bureau will be able to effectively police and punish non-compliant
65
institutions.
A. Chapter 585 Takes Aim at Unaccredited Institutions
66

An institution’s status as “unaccredited” is often a mark of poor educational
67
quality. Consequently, graduates of unaccredited institutions may be ineligible
for certain civil service jobs, and may be excluded from professional licensure
68
exams.
The concern surrounding unaccredited private institutions harkens back to
the 1980s, when California was known as the “diploma mill capital of the
69
world.” The legislature’s passage of the 1989 Act seemed to alleviate some of
70
the problem. However, with the rise of the Internet, diploma mills continue to
71
thrive in California and throughout the country.

doctoral degree were subject to this provision. Id. § 94897(p) (West Supp. 2012).
61. Id. § 94928(e)(1)–(3) (amended by Chapter 585).
62. Id. § 94928(e)(2)–(3) (amended by Chapter 585); id. § 94929.5(b) (amended by Chapter 585); id. §
94929.7(c) (amended by Chapter 585).
63. Tami Abdollah, California Lawmakers Target Diploma Mills, S. CAL. PUB. RADIO (May 10, 2012),
http://www.scpr.org/blogs/education/2012/05/10/6063/california-lawmakers-target-diploma-mills/ (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that more than half of the PhDs conferred in California each year may be
“fake” or “fraudulent,” and that institutions granting these degrees do not seek Bureau approval to operate).
64. Infra Part IV.B.
65. Gollan, supra note 4 (reporting that “up to 10 percent of the state's approved private postsecondary
schools have been allowed to operate with expired approvals,” that “some schools with expired approvals are
still listed as approved on the state's Web site,” that the Bureau does not make it a “general enforcement
practice” to track down institutions that operate illegally, and that the Bureau has not been able to effectively
follow through on the disciplinary measures it metes out).
66. Accreditation is a voluntary “peer review process” undertaken by an accreditation agency that is
approved by the U.S. Department of Education. EDUC. § 94813 (West Supp. 2012); SENATE RULES
COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2296, at 3 (Aug. 22, 2012).
67. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2296, at 3 (Aug. 22, 2012) (stating that
the purpose of accreditation is to determine the quality of private postsecondary institutions and the degree
programs they offer); Accredited Institutions & Unaccredited Institutions, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.
ed.gov/students/prep/college/diplomamills/accreditation.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2013) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (stating that the purpose of accreditation is to ensure educational quality, and that
unaccredited institutions may, though do not necessarily, provide a poor quality education).
68. Unaccredited Institutions, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/students/prep/college/diploma
mills/accreditation.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
69. FRANK, supra note 9, at ES-3; Editorial, Failing Vocational Students, supra note 14.
70. Stephanie Grace, Degrees of Deception, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Aug. 9, 1998, available at
1998 WLNR 1195088 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing California as a “one-time safe
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1. Chapter 585 Attempts to Protect Students by Targeting Diploma Mills
72

Diploma mills fraudulently induce students to purchase fake degrees. With
the growth of the Internet, major, legitimate institutions, such as Harvard and
73
UCLA, have begun offering online courses and degree programs. The large
number of legitimate institutions offering online degrees has created fertile
74
ground “for diploma mills to flourish.” Chapter 585 seeks to address this
problem by requiring that all unaccredited private institutions disclose their
accreditation status and the limits of the prospective degree before students
75
commit to paying.
Chapter 585 may induce a broader array of legitimate, unaccredited
institutions to report their accreditation status and the limits of the degrees they
76
offer. However, Chapter 585 is unlikely to have an effect on a majority of
diploma mills, because the very nature of these institutions is to “fly[] under the
77
radar” selling “fake” degrees. And while Chapter 585 does attempt to curb
78
diploma mills by imposing greater statutory requirements upon them, it seems

haven for diploma mills,” which has since corrected the problem after passage of the 1989 Act); Judy Lin, The
Governor Says Flaws Must Be Fixed in Bureau that Regulates For-Profit Operations: Vocational Schools Face
Loss of State Oversight, FRESNO BEE, Jan. 22, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 1279248 (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that consumer advocates feared that dissolution of the Bureau would bring
back the days when diploma mills openly operated).
71. Stephanie Armour, Diploma Mills Insert Degree of Fraud into Job Market, USA TODAY (Sept. 29,
2003, 12:48 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2003-09-28-fakedegrees_x.htm (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that the operator of ten-million dollar diploma mill was arrested for
running sham school over the Internet from an office in San Clemente, California).
72. Grace, supra note 70 (reporting that diploma mills use “fraudulent advertising gimmicks” to induce
students to purchase fake degrees (quoting Attorney General Richard Ieyoub)); Judy Lin, Vocational Schools
Face Loss of State Oversight, CAL. ST. UNIV. (Jan. 22, 2007), http://www.calstate.edu/pa/clips2007/january/22
jan/oversight.shtml (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that the purpose of governmental
oversight in California is to ensure “that private colleges and universities don't defraud their students”);
Abdollah, supra note 63 (stating that diploma mills “offer fraudulent degrees and certificates for little to no
work and an often significant fee”).
73. Armour, supra note 71; HARVARD EXTENSION SCH., http://www.extension.harvard.edu/degreescertificates (last visited Oct. 15, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); UCLA EXTENSION, https://
www.uclaextension.edu/pages/fos/ProgramLanding.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
74. Armour, supra note 71 (reporting that many diploma mills create names similar to legitimate
universities offering online extension programs, making the imposters difficult to spot).
75. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2296, at 2 (May 11, 2012); Abdollah, supra note
63 (stating that lawmakers sought “to determine how best to identify [diploma mills] and root them out without
quashing innovation”).
76. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 94897(p), 94909(a)(16) (amended by Chapter 585).
77. Abdollah, supra note 63.
78. EDUC. § 94909(a)(16) (amended by Chapter 585) (requiring all “associate, baccalaureate, master’s,
or doctoral” programs to inform students of their accreditation status and the limitations of the degree); id. §
94897(p) (West Supp. 2012) (requiring only unaccredited doctoral programs to accurately report their
accreditations status and the limitations of the degree).
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that the Bureau is ill-equipped to track down and discipline institutions that
79
simply choose to be noncompliant.
2. Chapter 585 Does Not Address the Dangers that Diploma Mills Pose to
the General Public
As the name suggests, many diploma mills serve as little more than
professional counterfeiting services that, for a fee, print fake degrees that look
80
legitimate. The general public relies on degreed professionals for a broad range
81
of services, including legal services, healthcare, education, and counseling. The
82
public views these degrees as an indicator of a professional’s qualifications.
Diploma mills endanger the public by allowing unqualified people to
83
masquerade as qualified professionals. While many students who turn to
diploma mills do so innocently, believing that the degree they seek is legitimate,
many more do so with the understanding that they will receive an advanced
84
diploma after completing virtually no course work. These diplomas allow
“graduates” to fool prospective employers and clients by creating an air of
legitimacy and competence, even though the graduate is unqualified to perform
85
the work. Thus, because diploma mills confer a large number of degrees to
people who knowingly wish to fool the public, it is unclear what, if any, effect
86
Chapter 585 will have in curbing the lucrative services diploma mills provide.
B. Chapter 585 Attempts to Improve the Accuracy of Institutional Reporting by
Changing the Statutory Definition of “Graduates Employed in the Field”
Chapter 585 changes the statutory definition of “graduates employed in the
87
field.” The author of this provision argues this change is necessary to correct an
88
ambiguity in the law. For instance, law schools often create short-term, paid

79. Gollan, supra note 4 (reporting that, due to understaffing, the Bureau does not make it a practice to
track down and discipline institutions that operate illegally).
80. Abdollah, supra note 63; Armour, supra note 71; Grace, supra note 70.
81. Armour, supra note 71 (reporting that people who have purchased degrees from diploma mills “have
held jobs as sex-abuse counselors, college vice presidents, child psychologists, athletic coaches and engineers”).
82. Id. (reporting that a mother who relied on diploma mill medical degrees that lined the walls of her
daughter’s doctor’s office followed the doctor’s medical advice, resulting in the death of her child).
83. Id.
84. Abdollah, supra note 63; Grace, supra note 70.
85. Armour, supra note 71 (reporting cases where people have knowingly purchased and used fake
degrees to obtain jobs as medical doctors, “sex-abuse counselors, college vice presidents, child psychologists,
athletic coaches and engineers”).
86. Abdollah, supra note 63; Armour, supra note 71 (reporting that, nationwide, diploma mills make an
estimated $500 million each year).
87. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94928(e)(1) (amended by Chapter 585).
88. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2296, at 4 (Aug. 22, 2012).
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positions for recent graduates to boost schools’ employment statistics. Under
the old definition, these graduates would be considered employed within the
field, because their degree played a significant role in the acquisition of their
90
short-term position. Chapter 585 aims to abate this practice by changing the
definitional character of “graduates employed in the field” to mean those
employed in a “single position for which the institution represents the program
91
prepare[d]” such graduates.
However, Chapter 585 could make it more difficult for schools to receive
92
accurate employment data. Opponents argue that institutions attempting to
determine whether a graduate’s job requirements meet the statutory definition
will hound employers, discouraging employers from hiring the institution’s
93
graduates. Moreover, graduates will be discouraged from providing their alma
maters with accurate information due to the stringent statutory tracking
94
requirements. Opponents believe that students may simply stop communicating
with the school after graduation, making it difficult for schools to comply with
the regulations, and potentially increasing the cohort default rate for future
95
students.
C. Does Chapter 585 Accomplish What It Sets Out to Do?
Chapter 585 attempts to protect prospective students from fraud and
96
deception by creating greater transparency. While on paper, Chapter 585 may
accomplish its goal; historically, the Bureau has had problems enforcing its
97
regulations. Where schools are in violation of Bureau regulations and operate
without state approval, the Bureau does not make it a practice to track down

89. Law, Education Remain Among Nation’s Best in Rankings, WILLIAM & MARY (Mar. 17, 2012),
http://www.wm.edu/news/stories/2012/law,-education-remain-among-nations-best-in-rankings.php (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
90. EDUC. § 94928(e) (West Supp. 2012).
91. Id. § 94928(e)(1) (amended by Chapter 585). A short-term position stacking books in a law-school
library, for instance, would likely not qualify under Chapter 585, because the law school does not represent to
prepare its students to stack books professionally. Id.
92. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2296, at 6 (Aug. 22, 2012).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2296, at 2–4 (May 11, 2012); SENATE RULES
COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2296, at 6 (Aug. 22, 2012); Lin, Vocational Schools Face Loss of
State Oversight, supra note 72 (reporting that the purpose of governmental oversight in California is to ensure
“that private colleges and universities don't defraud their students”).
97. Gollan, supra note 4 (reporting that, due to understaffing, the Bureau is unable to proactively ensure
that institutions operate in compliance); Elizabeth Redden, California Regulatin’, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Jan. 29,
2007), http://www. insidehighered.com/news/2007/01/29/california (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(reporting that the Bureau’s enforcement capabilities have historically been hampered by understaffing and a
backlog of consumer complaints).
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violators. Chapter 585 does not include a provision providing for greater
99
enforcement. Thus, even if schools fail to comply with the mandates of Chapter
585, it does not appear that the Bureau is in a position to enforce these
100
provisions.
V. CONCLUSION
Chapter 585 represents an attempt by the legislature to close reporting
loopholes present in prior law by mandating additional disclosure requirements
101
from private postsecondary institutions regarding accreditations status, known
102
103
104
limitations on degrees, wage and employment data, and cohort default rates.
Chapter 585 also mandates that institutions provide prospective students with this
105
data prior to enrollment. Additionally, the Bureau overseeing enforcement of
106
regulated institutions is given the authority to define standards and make
107
regulations. The purpose of this reform is to make California’s private
postsecondary and vocational institutions more transparent so that prospective
108
students can adequately weigh their options. However, without a statutory
mechanism providing the Bureau with greater resources, the long-term effects of
Chapter 585 are unknown because the Bureau does not appear to have the
109
resources necessary to discipline institutions that are currently non-complaint.

98. Gollan, supra note 4 (reporting that, even after the Bureau was recently made aware that 137 schools
are operating illegally, it “had no plans to follow up” beyond the issuance of “courtesy” notices informing the
institutions of their non-complaint status).
99. See generally 2012 Cal. Stat. ch. 585.
100. Gollan, supra note 4.
101. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94897(p)(1) (amended by Chapter 585)
102. Id. § 94897(p)(1)–(3) (amended by Chapter 585).
103. Id. § 94910(b), (d) (amended by Chapter 585).
104. Id. § 94910(h) (amended by Chapter 585).
105. Id. § 94911(i)(1)–(2) (amended by Chapter 585).
106. Id. § 94928(e)(2) (amended by Chapter 585).
107. Id. § 94929.5(b) (amended by Chapter 585).
108. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2296, at 4 (Aug. 22, 2012).
109. Gollan, supra note 4.
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